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Abstract
Identification and tracking of devices and objects has always been helpful in many
fields like transportation, tele-medicine, business and supply chain etc. Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are petite, wireless devices attached to objects
for the purpose of identification and information exchange. RFID systems is
composed of tags, readers and an application system. These tags can be identified
by a reader and are useful for tracking and monitoring. RFID tags uses Radio
Frequency (RF) for wireless communication which renders these tags vulnerable to
wireless security attacks. Implementation of RFID systems faces huge challenges
regarding privacy as these tags can be uniquely identified and thereby are subject to
tracking by an adversary. In this project a new privacy and mutual authentication
scheme has been discussed that uses cryptographic algorithms and can be used in
RFID systems to overcome the issues with privacy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification is a process of identifying objects over wireless
medium. RFID systems are automatic identification systems that uses
electromagnetic waves to transfer data for the purpose of identification. It does
not require the object to be visible for identification. RFID systems can identify
thousands of objects around a reader’s range within fraction of seconds.
RFID technology has surpassed the abilities of traditional barcode system.
Barcode system is another form of identifying objects. It requires scanning of
the object with precision. Barcode system usually identify the type of an object
but it cannot identify these items uniquely. Identifying an object requires human
participation for scanning the object with a barcode reader, it is not automated. On
the other hand RFID systems are fully automated systems which can work without
human interaction. It can identify objects from a distance and doesn’t require vision
of the object. RFID tags are able to store information regarding the object with
some level of security which barcodes cannot.
RFID system also supports ubiquitous services where each object is tagged with
RFID tags and can be uniquely identified and tracked by the system. The expansion
of market has led to the increase in flow of manufactured goods. The supply chains
can be easily regulated and maintained with the use of RFID technology. It can also
be implemented in tele-medicine and assist in many day to day activities.
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1.1 RFID System
RFID system is composed of three important entities [5]. Any system that has
to perform identification has to have some information about objects it identifies.
RFID systems stores information in a back-end database that also performs many
other operations. The back-end database is also called application system. Objects
are tagged with small RFID chips. These chips contain information necessary for
identification and each chip can be identified uniquely unlike barcode identification.
RFID readers are the devices that identify an object by interrogation and relay the
information back to the application system for verification.
Figure 1.1: RFID System
1.1.1 RFID Application System
An application system performs data processing and can be an application or a
database depending on the requirements of the RFID system. It is linked with the
RFID readers through a secure transmission channel for information sharing. It
contains important information regarding the RFID objects.
1.1.2 RFID Reader
RFID readers are also known as transceiver/ interrogator in RFID systems. Readers
initiate the identification task. Readers relay the information between tags and
2
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application system.
1.1.3 RFID Tag
Tags are small chips, comparable to a grain of rice, attached to objects that are
to be identified by the system. Each tag has a unique identification number
initially provided by the system. Tags responds to a reader’s query by sending
the information stored in it.
1.2 RFID Tags
RFID tags are devices meant for wireless transmission of data. It has a size
comparable to a grain of rice, some 0.4mm2 [4]. There are various types of RFID
tags which can be categorised as active tags, passive tags and semi-active tags [3].
1. Active RFID Tags
Active RFID tags have the characteristics of a transponder. They have
their own power source and transmitter. These tags have a long range for
transmission. Active tags operate in UHF radio bands.
2. Passive RFID Tags
Passive tags do not have their own power source. They use the energy of the
interrogating Radio Frequency as their power source. These tags can operate
in UHF or LF radio bands.
3. Semi-Active RFID Tags
These tags have battery assisted power supply. However, they do not have
their own transmitter.
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1.2.1 Read Ranges
Apart from the distinction of tags based on their power source they are also classified
based on their range of operation. The operable ranges for RFID tags are specified
by RFID Standards and product specifications. Considering the range of operations,
RFID tags roughly operates in four different ranges [4].
1. Nominal Read Range
This specify the maximum distances within which a reader can scan tag data.
For example, a nominal read range of 10 cm is specified by ISO 14443 for
contactless smartcards [4].
2. Rogue Scanning Range
The range of reader extends when equipped with powerful antenna. A rogue
reader may be equipped with such technique to exceed the legal limits. This
range is maximum for a reader at which it can power and read tag data. For
example, ISO 14443 tags can be read from a distance of 50cm by a rogue
reader.
3. Tag to Reader Eavesdropping Range
When a reader sends interrogation signals to a tag, the tag responds by
transmitting stored information in it. An illegitimate reader can then
eavesdrop and collect information transmitted by the tag. The range of such
a reader is called tag-to-reader eavesdropping range and can be greater than
rogue scanning range.
4. Reader to Tag Eavesdropping Range
In some RFID systems readers send data specific to tags, like in query base
anti-collision protocol the query is part of the tag’s ID. Since readers operate
at much higher power than tags, they are more susceptible to eavesdropping.
4
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1.3 RFID Standards
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has furnished multiple
standards that serves different purposes for the implementation of RFID systems.
Some of the important standards by the ISO are tabulated below.
Table 1.1: ISO standards
Standard Description
11784 How data is to be structured in tag.
11785 Defines protocols for air interface.
14443 Defines protocols for contactless smartcards
15693 Defines protocols for vicinity cards.
18047 Standards for testing the conformance of RFID tags.
18046 For testing the performance of RFID tags and readers.
The situation for standardization became in jeopardy when Auto-ID center, which
developed EPC technologies, created its own air interface protocols for tracking of
goods through the international supply chain. The Auto-ID centre rejected the
standards proposed by ISO, because the ISO UHF protocol was too complex and
unnecessarily increasing the cost of the tags [16]. Auto ID centre developed RFID
tags categorized in five classes:
• Class 1: Passive tags that backscatter the signals by a reader. Read only
memory that is non-volatile.
• Class 2: Passive tags that backscatter the reader’s signals. It has read-write
memory of up to 65 KB.
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• Class 3: These are semi-passive tags which have built-in battery to support
increased read range.
• Class 4: Active tag that has a battery for power supply. It also has a
transmitter.
• Class 5: Active tags that are compatible with other class 4 and class 5 tags.
1.4 Singulation
RFID systems are used to identify objects uniquely. It works in wireless media
in which readers send out radio signals for communication with tags and the tags
respond to these interrogation signals with the information stored in them. For a tag
to respond to a reader it needs to be in the range of the reader. If there are multiple
tags within the range of a reader, all of them will respond to the reader. Since these
tags operate at a common frequency, tag collision occurs. Tag collision is a problem
in which multiple tags respond to an interrogation signal of a reader simultaneously
and the reader cannot decode the signals because of signal collision [5]. Tag collision
prevents a reader from recognizing a tag and thus increases communication overhead.
To avoid this problem there are many anti-collision protocols. The anti-collision
protocols can be broadly divided into two types [5]
1. ALOHA based protocols (probabilistic protocols)
2. Tree based protocols (Deterministic protocols)
1.4.1 ALOHA based protocols
ALOHA based protocols tend to reduce the occurrence probability of tag collision.
In this protocol each tag transmits its ID at a selected time based on the type of
ALOHA protocol. However, ALOHA based protocols fails to prevent tag collision
completely. They are subject to a serious problem of tag starvation [2]. In tag
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starvation a tag is denied from transmitting its ID or roughly speaking it does not
get a chance for transmitting.
1.4.2 Tree based protocols
Tree based protocols, on the other hand constructs a tree while identifying tags.
They split the set of tags in the reader’s vicinity into two subsets at a time and tend
to identify the tags in each subset. One of the advantage of tree based protocols is
that, it does not suffer from tag starvation problem. In this project a variation of tree
based protocol known as AQS is used to avoid the tag collision problem. There are
several variations of tree based protocols like Binary Tree protocol (BT), Query Tree
protocol (QT), Adaptive Binary Splitting protocol (ABS), Adaptive Query Splitting
protocol (AQS). Among the mentioned protocols, best performance is observed in
AQS [2] with lesser number of collisions and transmission of bits.
AQS Protocol
This is a MAC protocol used in wireless singulation. In this protocol, a tree is built
from the IDs of tags. If the length of tag identifiers is L then the depth of tree
is L. The binary tree is built in this manner: The root is labelled NULL. For a
node having binary label s, the left child of the node has label s‖‘0’and the right
child of the node has label s‖‘1’. Reader sends a request to all tags within its range.
Tags acknowledge the reader’s request with the first bit of their identifier. If the
reader receives ‘0’ bit as the only response, then it concludes that all tag identifiers
lie in the left half of the tree and recurses on the left half of the tree. Conversely,
a response of ‘1’causes the reader to recurse on the right half of the tree. If a tag
collision occurs, that is, some tags emit ‘0’ bits and others emit ‘1’ bits, then the
reader has to recurse on both halves of the tree. The reader needs to perform a
depth first search of this tree to identify individual tags.
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Figure 1.2: AQS Singulation protocol
1.5 Authentication
RFID systems are automatic identification systems in which tagged objects are
identified and can be monitored automatically without or with fewer human
interaction. General RFID tags respond to any reader’s query. The process of
identification poses a threat to privacy of individuals. If any reader can identify a
tag then it can be tracked down by an adversary, which is known as clandestine
tracking. If such tags can be identified without the knowledge of the tag bearer, an
adversary can also perform clandestine inventorying.
Clandestine tracking and clandestine inventorying are two major privacy issues
regarding the RFID system. The problem becomes serious when the tags serial
number also contain some personal information. EPC tags in particular carry
information regarding the manufacturer details, class of object etc. [4]. Clandestine
tracking can be prevented if the tag confuses the adversary and cannot be traced.
This can be achieved if the tag responds with a different identity to each new
interrogation by a reader. By changing its identity a tag can avoid tracking issue.
Clandestine inventorying can be prevented if the tag only share personal information
8
Chapter 1 Introduction
with genuine reader. A reader which should be able to validate its authenticity to a
tag to obtain information stored in the tag. This can be achieved by authentication
of reader to tag.
Privacy can be achieved with authentication. Genuine readers validate
themselves to obtain information or to get the ID of a tag. Authentication
can be performed using symmetric key protocols or asymmetric key protocols.
Privacy problem for symmetric key enabled RFID-tags lies in the challenge of
key management. Cryptographically secured authentication or identification of
an RFID-tag Ti relies on the symmetric key Ki shared between the tag and
RFID-application system.
In various existing schemes, the common operation for authentication include
the following two steps:
i. Tag Ti sends E = fKi(P)
E : Encryptedtext
P : Plaintext sent by reader
fKi : Encryption function using key Ki
ii. On receiving the encrypted text E from a tag, the reader searches the space
of all keys K in the systems database for the key Ki
E ′ = fKj(P)
if E ′ = E, then Tj = Ti
This leads to a problem as discussed below:
• Tag identifies itself prior to authenticating reader at all. The tag Ti emits its
unique identifier IDi promiscuously. Privacy in such condition is unachievable,
since any reader can learn the tag’s ID.
• A reader cannot authenticate a tag unless it has been identified by the reader.
If the reader has no knowledge about the identity of tag, it cannot determine
which key Ki to use for authenticating the tag.
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It is necessary for a reader to identify a tag uniquely so to avoid tag collision.
After identifying a tag, the reader can communicate with the tag. However, an
RFID-tag, if identified before authentication is subject to tracking and hence,
violates privacy. Since, any reader can obtain the tag’s ID. Conversely, an RFID-tag
cannot be authenticated before identification, because the interrogating reader
doesn’t know which key to use for authentication.
1.6 Applications of RFID systems
Being an automatic identification system the application domain of RFID system
is vast. With the application of RFID system smart cities and smart environments
can be created. Use of sensors along with RFID tags can change the way several
systems that are operating traditionally like the supply chain management. RFID
technology can be used to assist the concept of pervasive computing also known
as Internet of Things. The function of identification can be extended to perform
tracking of objects. Tracking is the process of observing persons or objects on the
move and providing timely information to a system [3].
The most interesting and successful implementation of RFID system include the
following:
• Supply chain management
• Production process control
• Object tracking management
Now RFID has been broadly used in the following fields:
• Retail: Supply chain control, Payments and Transactions, Product
Management.
• Logistics: Quality of shipment conditions, Item Location, Fleet Tracking.
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• Smart metering: Smart Grid, Tank Level, Water flow, Silos Stock Calculation.
• Smart Cities: Smart Parking, Traffic Congestion, Smart Lighting.
• Health care and Telemedicine: Health assistance for aged or disabled people,
Patients Surveillance, Vital signs monitoring in high performance centres and
fields.
• Military and Defence: Detection of friend or foe, tracking of artillery.
1.7 Motivation
RFID systems supports automatic identification and are helpful for tracking of
objects or persons. RFID tags responds to any reader’s query and hence expose
their identity to the reader. In such a scenario anyone having a reader can track a
person or object. Moreover clandestine inventorying can also be initiated. In either
case there is a privacy breach. Privacy preservation in RFID systems has been a
debate from decades.
There has been a lot of research work going on to eliminate the problem of privacy
regarding RFID systems. However the issue of performing identification before
authentication and vice-versa has been addressed by a few with a little resolution
to the problem. In this project a scheme is presented that aims at preserving the
privacy of an object in the RFID system and performing mutual authentication
between the reader and tag without disclosing any sensitive information.
1.8 Objective
There are several security challenges regarding RFID systems like DOS attacks,
privacy, profiling, eavesdropping and inventory jamming etc. [16]. Our proposed
work focuses mainly on the privacy issues regarding RFID systems. The main
objectives of the proposed work are as follows:
11
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i. Untraceability: The RFID tags should not be susceptible to tracing.
ii. Identification: Tags should be easily identifiable to a genuine reader.
iii. Mutual Authentication: An RFID reader should authenticate itself to a tag
prior to sharing information.
Our proposed scheme will avoid tracing issues by confusing a fake reader. It
will also perform identification followed by mutual authentication to verify that the
interrogating reader is genuine.
1.9 Organization of thesis
1. Chapter 1: A detailed introduction to RFID systems has been presented.
The security issues regarding RFID system are briefly discussed. Application
domain of the system is mentioned.
2. Chapter 2: In this chapter we present the literature review where we have
discussed existing privacy and authentication protocols for RFID systems.
3. Chapter 3: In this chapter we present our proposed scheme for privacy
preservation and mutual authentication.
4. Chapter 4: In this chapter we analyse our schemes in the context of privacy
and authentication issues.
5. Chapter 5: We conclude our work in this chapter.
12
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Literature Review
In [3], Xiaolin et. al. discusses how RFID technology can accompany pervasive
computing. They describes the integration of RFID technology with IoT with
the help of three layers which are perception layer, network layer, service layer.
Perception layer collects all kinds of information from the physical world. The
network layer provides an efficient and trusted network infrastructure to large scale
industry application. The problems of tag collision and privacy threats in RFID
systems are also discussed.
A research survey by Ari Juels in [4] discusses the security and privacy issues
faced by RFID systems. Many cryptographic and non-cryptographic approaches
are discussed in this survey. The following subsection discusses few approaches for
protection of privacy.
1. Non-cryptographic approaches
i. Kill Tag approach
This is the simplest and straightforward approach towards protection
of privacy. When a product has been purchased by a customer the
tag attached to the object is simply disabled by a KILL command.
This approach has manifested many issues. It eliminates the usage and
advantages of the RFID tag in the product after it has been purchased.
13
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Instead of killing the tag it was also suggested to cause the tag to sleep
by giving a SLEEP command. The tag can be woken-up by a WAKE
UP signal. However, in such a case any reader genuine of fake, can cause
the tag to sleep or wake-up. This requires a scheme in which a reader
has to authenticate itself to the tag before sending SLEEP or WAKE UP
signals.
ii. Active Jamming approach
The bearer of an RFID tagged object may carry a jammer that actively
broadcast radio signals to any nearby reader. This will cause the reader to
get stuck during identification. This approach may be illegal as mentioned
in [6].
2. Cryptographic approaches
i. The Hash-Lock approach
In this approach a tag is locked with a value y, and it is unlocked
by presentation of a PIN value x such that y=h(x) for a standard
one-way-function h. This approach itself violates privacy as stated in [6].
After a tag has been locked, a reader require to know its meta-ID y, so
that it can give the PIN value x for unlocking the tag. Thus the tag is
still exposed to tracking issue with its meta-ID.
Juels et. al. in [6] discussed a blocker tag approach for privacy in RFID systems.
They call this approach as selective blocking approach. This approach exploits the
tree walking singulation protocol to provide privacy. A blocker tag has been proposed
in this scheme that simulates the IDs of all the tags in a certain zone marked as
private zone. This approach has limitations for practical implementations. Use of a
blocker tag prevents clandestine inventorying. This approach requires the RFID tag
to be within the communication range of the blocker tag.
In [13] Ari Juels proposed an authentication scheme for privacy which is called as
minimalist cryptography approach. In this approach tags bear a set of pseudonyms
14
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which is used for authentication. A tag responds with a different pseudonym
with each successive interrogation. The tags does not respond with the same
pseudonym twice during its lifetime. The pseudonyms are updated by a reader
upon requirement. An adversary may clone a tag by collecting the pseudonyms
stored in a legal tag. To avoid the cloning issue Juels proposes that tags throttle
their tag emissions.
Weis et. al. [8] proposed a new scheme for authentication in RFID systems.
In this approach, an RFID tag generates a random nonce value R and computes
the hash of it using a hash function stored in the tag. Upon receiving the tuple
〈h(Ki, R), R〉, the reader performs an exhaustive search to get the key from the
database. The major problem with this approach is the key search which is linear to
the number of tags in the system. Practically, if there are many tags in the system
then, identifying any one of them can be prohibitively costly.
Ohkubo et. al. [9] used synchronization approach for authentication of tags and
readers. The main purpose of the scheme is forward privacy. In this approach the
system synchronizes its state with that of the tag. Every tag Ti maintains a counter
Ci that is incremented with every reader’s interrogation. Upon interrogation the
tag outputs a hash value of the counter. A genuine reader knows the approximate
current value of the counter as the tag is synchronized with the system.
OSK protocol is a single round protocol for authentication. This protocol uses
two one-way hash functions G and H. These hash functions are stored in the tag
as well as the system’s database. Initially all tags share an exclusive secret with
the system. For each tag let the secret starts with Si. When a reader sends a
request to the tag, the tag computes E = G(Si) and updates the secret to Si+1
= H(Si). The reader receives E and performs an exhaustive search for each tag
k. After identifying a tag Tk the system also performs S
k
i+1 = H(S
k
i ) and stores
it in the database. The tag and system both updates the shared secret S with
each interrogation. Both the reader and system are synchronized. This scheme is
susceptible to de-synchronization attack. Apart from desynchronization attack the
15
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protocol takes too long to identify a tag as identification of a tag is linear to the
number of tags in the system.
Ryu et. al. in [7] implemented public key encryption algorithm to strengthen the
security and support privacy in RFID systems. Their authentication has a layout of
two phases. The first phase is key generation phase in which the system generates
public key (Pk) and private key (Sk). The system also produce a set ∆ that is
stored in a tag. The set ∆ is generated as follows ∆ ← {α1 = EPk (ID‖ r1), ..,αm=
EPk(ID‖r1)}. The authentication process consists of three rounds which mutually
authenticates both the reader and tag. This authentication system only supports
private tags. Public tags are not considered in their scheme. A reader cannot detect
whether a tag has been queried by a fake reader in past. In such case it becomes
difficult for the system to decide when to update the stored ∆ set.
2.1 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed various proposed schemes for privacy and
authentication. Because of limit on the computational capability of RFID tags the
security and privacy schemes faces a lot of challenges. Non-cryptographic schemes
are favoured for passive RFID-tags whereas lightweight cryptographic protocols are
being implemented in active RFID-tags.
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Privacy Preserving Mutual
Authentication
From the introduction to the topic and literature review one can clearly infer that
privacy is a major concern in RFID systems. There are many proposed ideas to
preserve privacy by implementing cryptographic and non-cryptographic schemes.
Some of these schemes are not practically implementable while some are too much
resource intensive.
3.1 Proposed Scheme for privacy
In this chapter we present a cryptographic scheme that uses the power of asymmetric
key protocol to preserve privacy in RFID systems. This is scalable and can be
implemented practically. This scheme is inspired from the work in [7]. Our proposed
scheme is an improvement over their proposed work in several ways that are discussed
in the next chapter where we evaluate our proposed scheme.
3.1.1 Assumptions
There are certain assumptions made by our scheme regarding the RFID system like:
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1. All RFID tags has a special STATUS WORD, which is of specific length
chosen by the system. The tags are capable of computing hash value with
a stored hash function H. Tags can generate random values. Each private
tag contain a set of serial numbers S referred to as pseudo-ID set, which can
be updated by an authentic reader. This set of serial numbers are used as
identifiers for the tag.
2. The communication link between an RFID reader and application system is
secure.
3. The application system stores the actual identifier (ID) for each tag along with
important information. Since, the communication channel between readers and
application system is assumed to be secure, both can be treated as a single
entity.
3.2 RFID System
Our proposed scheme describes the RFID system in terms of its three important
entities, that is, RFID tags, RFID readers and an application system.
Figure 3.1: RFID System
The features of the RFID entities are as follows:
1. RFID Application System: The application system is the core of the RFID
system. It performs several tasks as mentioned below.
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(a) Generation of private key and public key for the RFID system based on
the chosen public key encryption algorithm, i.e. RSA, El-Gamal etc.
(b) Executes all database operations. The database is a part of the
application system. All the important information like the identifiers
of tags, keys are stored in the database.
(c) Generation of Identifiers for public and private tags. It also generates
keys for the private tags.
(d) It verifies the authenticity of a tag based on the data received from a
reader.
2. RFID Reader: The reader acts as a relay object between the application system
and an RFID tag. It is used for interrogating an RFID tag. The information
received from the tag is sent back to the application system to verify the tag’s
authenticity. A reader performs the following tasks:
(a) It is responsible for singulation of the RFID tags.
(b) It also detects whether an RFID tag has been interrogated by a fake
reader in the past.
(c) A reader can update the set of IDs S stored in an RFID tag.
(d) It executes the authentication protocol and relays the data back to the
application system for authenticating an RFID tag.
3. RFID tag: Tags are tiny microchips attached to objects and may contain
important information about the objects. RFID tags has the following features:
(a) It responds to a reader’s interrogation.
(b) Each tag has a unique identifier set S provided by the RFID application
system. A tag uses one of the identifier from the set for identification
during an interrogation.
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(c) A special set of bits that defines the status of an RFID tag is stored in
each tag. In our scheme we call it as STATUS WORD (SW). The
length of SW can be set-up based upon implementation. In our scheme
the length is set to be of 8 bits.
(d) A tag can update its SW after interrogation.
3.2.1 Significance of STATUS WORD
In this scheme we introduce a special sequence of bits termed as STATUS WORD.
The length of the sequence can be changed depending on implementation, however,
in this scheme we have implemented it with 8 bits for simplicity. The SW of a tag
indicates the status of that tag. It tells the reader whether it is a public tag or a
private tag. The SW can also give information to the reader whether the tag has
been interrogated by a fake reader in the past. It is helpful getting such information
when privacy is to be preserved. The reader is able to determine when to update
the identifier set S of a tag based on the information from the SW. The SW also
tells the tag which identifier to use during an interrogation for identification. Thus,
SW plays a major role in preserving privacy of a tag.
Figure 3.2: STATUS WORD
This scheme also supports the use of public tags. All public tags have a single
ID and their SW is set to “00000001”. The length of ID for public tags is smaller
than the length of pseudo-ID for private tags. Each private tag contain a set of
pseudo-IDs S and initially their SW is set to “10000001”. This indicates that the
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Table 3.1: Specification of bits in SW
BIT STATUS Description
1 0 Tells the readers that the tag is a public tag
1 1 Tells the reader that the tag is a private tag
2 0 Tells the reader that the tag is normal
2 1 Tells the reader that the tag has been interrogated by a
fake reader which failed to authenticate itself
3-8 . Tells the tag which pseudo-ID to use for identification.
E.g. “000001”indicates first pseudo-Id to use as ID.
tag is private and informs the tag to use the first identifier from the ID set. This
also tells the reader that the tag has not been queried by a fake reader.
Figure 3.3: Representation of public and private tags
3.2.2 Phases of the proposed scheme
The proposed scheme works in three phases. These phases are explained below.
1. Phase 1: Set-up Phase
In this phase the RFID application system performs key generation and tag
deployment. The key generation task is performed only once. The system
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generates public and private keys according to the chosen asymmetric key
cryptographic protocol like RSA. Deployment of tags is a complex process in
which each tag is given a unique set of IDs referred to as S.
(a) Key Generation: Public Key (Pk)
Private Key (Sk)
(b) Tag Deployment: The tags are assigned unique serial numbers. Public
tags can be deployed normally. Their serial number serves as ID for
identification. Status Word is set as “00000001”.
Private tags are deployed according to the following steps:
i. For each private tag Ti with serial number IDi, generate a set of
random numbers R.
R = { r1, r2, . . . ,rj }
ii. Compute the ID set S.
Si = { α1 , α2 , . . . , αj }
Where αj = E( IDi ‖ rj , Pk)
j <26, as 6 bits of SW are used for indexing the pseudoID for tag.
iii. The status word of private tags are set to “10000001”
iv. Generate a random key Ki for the tag Ti.
v. The tuple (Si , Ki) is stored in the tag Ti.
vi. The tuple (IDi , Ki) is stored in the systems database.
2. Phase 2: Protocol execution
This phase of the scheme is executed when a reader tries to get information
about a tag. In this phase two tasks are performed. First a reader identifies
the tags in its range and then authenticates the tags with which it wants to
exchange information.
(a) Identification: Reader broadcasts a signal requesting the tags in its range
to identify themselves. The tags responds to the reader’s request with
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their serial ID. Since all the tags operate at a common frequency and
responds to the reader at the same time, tag collision occurs if there are
multiple tags in the reader’s range. A tree based anti-collision protocol
known as AQS [2,12] is used for singulation of RFID tags. This protocol
has been discussed in Chapter 1. After singulation of tags the reader has
the serial-ID of each tag in its range. This ID information can be used
by the reader to communicate with a tag avoiding tag collision.
(b) Authentication: To exchange information with a private tag, both
the reader and tag needs to be mutually authenticated. Reader
has the serial-ID of each tag in its range after identification process.
Authentication is performed in four steps discussed below.
i. Step 1: Reader generates a random nonce (RR) and send it to the
tag Ti with serial-ID αi.
Figure 3.4: Packet 1
ii. Step 2: A tag performs the following operation after receiving a nonce
(RR) from a reader.
A. Computes the hash of AuthT using its own key k and the stored
hash function H.
AuthT = Hk (α ‖ RR)
B. Generates a random nonce value RT .
C. Sends the tuple <AuthT , RT >back to the reader.
iii. Step 3: The reader performs the following task to authenticate the
tag under interrogation.
A. Performs the decryption using the private key of the system (Sk).
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Figure 3.5: Packet 2
D(α, Sk) = ID ‖ r
B. Parses the decrypted value up to L bits to get the actual ID of
the tag as stored in the database of the system.
C. Retrieves the key from the system and computes the hash value
using the stored hash function H.
AuthT´= Hk(α ‖ RR)
D. Compares the hashed value with AuthT . If the values are equal
then the tag is genuine and authenticated to the reader. If the
values are not equal then the tag is not a valid tag and the
authentication process halts.
AuthT ´= AuthT
then, the tag is authenticated
else unsuccessful authentication
E. The reader computes AuthR and sends it back to the tag for
mutual authentication.
AuthR = Hk(α ‖ RT )
Figure 3.6: Packet 3
iv. Step 4: In this step the tag verifies the authenticity of the reader.
The tag computes AuthR´and matches it with AuthR. If the values
are equal then the reader is also authenticated to the tag.
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AuthR´= Hk(α ‖ RT )
then tag and reader are mutually authenticated
else unsuccessful authentication
3. Phase 3: Update
This step is necessary for preserving privacy. An update is performed based
on conditions. The condition may be a successful authentication or an
unsuccessful one.
(a) Successful authentication: The tag updates its SW so that the index
represented by SW[3-8] is incremented by one.
e.g.: initially SW = “10000001”
After successful authentication it is updated to “10000010”
(b) Unsuccessful authentication: The tag updates its SW so that the index
is incremented by one, as shown in the previous example. It also sets the
second bit of the STATUS WORD.
SW = “11000010”
When the second bit of SW is set, it indicates the reader that the tag has been
queried by a fake reader. The reader updates the identifier set S of the tag to
preserve privacy.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our proposed scheme for preserving privacy in
RFID systems by describing the four phases. Our scheme uses public key
encryption algorithm (e.g. RSA) and a hash function for the purpose of mutual
authentication. This scheme does not impose burden on the tag to perform
cryptographic encryption/decryption.
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Evaluation of proposed scheme
4.1 Implementation
The scheme is implemented using java. MySql database is used as the back-end
database to store the information about tags. The implementation contain four
important classes which are RFIDTags, Reader, Server, Env. RFIDTags and
Reader class are analogous to tags and readers in the RFID system where as
server is analogous to application system. Env class is the module which creates
an environment where readers interrogate tags. It assumes that tags are static and
are within the range of the reader.
Figure 4.1: RFID system environment
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We have used the tree-walking singulation protocol to resolve the issue of tag
collision during identification of RFID tags. There are many tree based singulation
protocols out of which we have used the AQS singulation protocol because it has
lesser number of transmissions compared to all other protocols. It also has lesser
number of collisions. The algorithm for Tree Generation is presented below:
Algorithm 1: Tree Generation Algorithm
Result: Returns a binary tree
Data: root, pref, next bit
1 if pref == NULL then
2 if next bit == 0 then
3 Add a node to the left of root with label 0;
4 else
5 Add a node to the right of root with label 1;
6 end
7 else
8 Traverse tree from root according to bits in the pref reaching a node N;
9 if next bit == 0 then
10 Add a node to the left of N with label pref ‖ 0;
11 else
12 Add a node to the right of N with label pref ‖ 1;
13 end
14 end
15 pref = pref ‖ next bit;
27
Chapter 4 Evaluation of proposed scheme
The singulation algorithm is presented below:
Algorithm 2: Singulation Algorithm
Result: Returns a tree where each leaf node is a tag-ID
Data: A, root, L
1 pref = NULL, stack[L] = empty, top = -1, coll bit = -1, next bit = 0, len =
pref.length;
2 for all elements in A do
3 if A[i][len] != next bit then
4 top = top+1 ;
5 push pref ‖ coll bit to stack ;
6 end
7 end
8 while top != -1 do
9 if len < L then
10 if pref matches prefix of A[i] then
11 next bit = A[i][len+1] ;
12 Repeat steps 2-6
13 end
14 else
15 pref = stack[top];
16 next bit = last bit of stack[top];
17 end
18 root = Generate(root, pref, next bit);
19 end
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Table 4.1: Notations used in algorithm
Notation Definition
A Array of addresses of tags within the range of a reader.
root Root of the tree which is constructed by the walking tree
singulation protocol
L Length of ID of a tag
‖ Concatenation operator
4.2 Challenges and Security Attacks
RFID systems faces two important challenges regarding privacy which are
clandestine tracking and clandestine inventorying as mentioned in [4]. Our scheme
satisfies the requirements to avoid both these problems. The tags responds with
different IDs in successive interrogations which confuses the reader and avoids
tracking. Our scheme also has a layout for authentication mechanism that prevents
illegal readers from obtaining personal information stored in tags.
4.2.1 Security Attacks
There are many known security attacks on RFID systems, some of which are
eavesdropping, desynchronization, spoofing, replaying. We analyse our scheme
against each of these security attacks.
Eavesdropping
Tags responds to reader’s request with a pseudo-ID which is encrypted with RSA
by the application system and stored in the tags. An adversary listening to
the transmissions cannot decrypt the pseudo-ID to get the actual ID. Mutual
authentication is solely based on one-way hash function. Based on the difficulty
of inverting an OWF, it prevents an illegal reader from getting any information
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regarding the key of a tag.
Desynchronization
This attack is a major concern in hash based RFID mutual authentication protocols
[11]. Desynchronization attack is possible in authentication protocols where the
tag and application system shares a common secret and updates that secret with
each successful authentication. In this scheme the application system and tags do
share a secret, that is the secret key ki for tag Ti, but the system and tags are
not synchronized. There is no synchronization information stored in the application
system about the tag apart from the secret key and tag’s ID.
Spoofing
In this attack an adversary A impersonate a legal tag. An attacker cannot rewrite or
replace tags and pass the authentication process successfully. The tag’s information
may be modified by an attacker but the tag cannot validate its authenticity as
discussed below:
Table 4.3: Notations and Definitions
Notation Definition
S Legal set of Pseudo-ID
S´ Tampered set of pseudo-ID
k Legitimate key
k´ Tampered key
The information stored in the tag, which is (S, k), can be modified
S = {α1, α2, .. , αm }
S´= {α′1 , α′2 , .. , α′m }
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In this case the hash value AuthT as mentioned in chapter 3 doesn’t match Auth
′
T as
computed by the reader. The reader will know that the tag is not a legal instance.
Replaying
In this attack an adversary gathers information from a session of authentication
and tries to get further information using it later. The proposed scheme is not
susceptible to reply attack because for each authentication session a new random
nonce is generated. AuthT sent by attacker will not match Auth
′
T computed by the
reader.
4.3 Complexity Analysis
We used Adaptive Query Splitting (AQS) [2, 12] protocol for avoiding tag collision
during tag identification. AQS makes the least number of collisions and has the
least number of transmitted bits as compared to other anti-collision protocols. The
authentication mechanism requires three transmissions, two from the reader and once
from the tag. Searching the key in the database is of constant time as it requires
only one decryption operation to get the actual ID of a tag from its pseudo-ID.
Table 4.5: Comparison of Authentication Schemes
Scheme Readertime Tagtime Readerspace Tagspace Comm.
WSRE [4] O(N) O(1) O(N) O(1) O(1)
MSW [7] O(logN) O(logN) O(1) O(logN) O(logN)
OSK [7] O(N) O(1) O(N) O(1) O(1)
Our Scheme O(1) O(1) O(1) O(m) O(1)
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i. Readertime : Time taken by an RFID-reader to obtain key of the tag once it
is identified with its pseudo-ID α.
ii. Tagtime : Time taken by an RFID-tag to authenticate itself to a reader.
iii. Readerspace : Space requirement for the reader to authenticate an RFID-tag.
iv. Tagspace : Space requirement for the tag to get authenticated by an
RFID-reader.
v. Comm. : Number of communications between reader and tag during the
authentication session.
Justification regarding the claims of our scheme
Readertime O(1) : Reader performs only one decryption operation to obtain the
key of a tag from the database. Hence, the retrieval of key is of constant time,
independent of the number of tags in the RFID-System.
Tagtime O(1) : A tag performs only two hashing operations for authentication,
independent of the number of tags.
Readerspace O(1) : A reader uses the pseudonym (α) obtained from singulation to
authenticate a tag. The length of the pseudonym is same for all private tags chosen
by the system.
TagSpace O(m) : A tag is required to store its pseudo-ID set S, hash values and
nonce. Tag space depends on the size of S, i.e. m.
Comm. O(1) : A total of three transmissions are required for mutual
authentication.
We compared our scheme with OSK. Fig.4.2 shows the result of authenticating
a group of tags and Fig.4.3 shows the result of authenticating a single tag. It can be
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clearly concluded that the proposed scheme takes lesser time to authenticate large
number of tags as compared to OSK. Further, our proposed scheme authenticates a
tag in constant time.
Figure 4.2: Authenticating a number of tags
Figure 4.3: Authenticating a single tag
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter we analysed our scheme against probable security attacks in RFID
systems. Our scheme has an advantage that a tag can inform a genuine reader about
a fake interrogation in the past. This helps the reader to change the pseudo-ID set
S of the tag to avoid tracking. The key management problem is solved with a key
search in constant time.
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Conclusion
This thesis deals with preserving privacy in RFID systems. The scheme proposed
in this thesis avoids the issues of traceability, eavesdropping and desynchronization
which are of a major concern in RFID systems. Traceability of tagged objects or
person by illegal reader is a major challenge in RFID systems. Therefore, we have
presented a layout of mutual authentication scheme that authenticates a reader
before sharing sensitive information stored in the tags. The tags avoids tracking
by confusing the reader by responding with different pseudo-ID in each successive
interrogation. A genuine reader can track an object or person by identifying the
attached tag, but a fake reader cannot.
Our proposed scheme uses public key encryption algorithms for preserving
privacy in RFID systems. The RFID tags doesn’t have to bear the burden
of computation regarding encryption/decryption. The only resource intensive
operation to be performed by a tag is hashing and generating random numbers.
Scope for Future Research
In our proposed scheme the only resource intensive task performed by an RFID tag
is computing a hash function. Light-weight hash functions will surely reduce the
burden of a tag.
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